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We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions – dismissal barriers, and 
bonus pay - affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and 
repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on 
worker performance, and market efficiency, by interfering with firms’ use of firing threat as 
an incentive device. Dismissal barriers also distort the dynamics of worker effort levels over 
time, cause firms to rely more on the spot market for labor, and create a distribution of 
relationship lengths in the market that is more extreme, with more very short and more very 
long relationships. The introduction of a bonus pay option dramatically changes the market 
outcome. Firms are observed to substitute bonus pay for threat of firing as an incentive 
device, almost entirely offsetting the negative incentive and efficiency effects of dismissal 
barriers. Nevertheless, contract enforcement behavior remains fundamentally changed, 
because the option to pay bonuses causes firms to rely less on long-term relationships. Our 
results show that market outcomes are the result of a complex interplay between contract 
enforcement policies and the institutions in which they are embedded. 
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1. Introduction
This paper uses experimental labor markets to study how two important, and often con-
troversial, institutions ￿ dismissal barriers, and bonus pay ￿ a￿ect contract enforcement
behavior. We focus on a setting with incomplete contracts as this is a ubiquitous charac-
teristic of employment relationships.
1 We also allow for repeated interactions, because a
prominent theoretical solution to the contract enforcement problem associated with incom-
pleteness involves employers and employees interacting in a repeated game. In particular,
the theory involves employers using a combination of rents and threat of dismissal to give
workers an incentive to perform (e.g., Klein and Le￿er (1981), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)
and MacLeod and Malcomson (1989)).
Dismissal barriers are a particularly important institution to study in the context of in-
complete contracts, given the strategic importance of ￿ring threat in such settings. Dismissal
barriers have the potential to radically change the strategic interaction of ￿rms and workers
within relationships, as well as patterns of relationship formation in the market. Dismissal
barriers arise, for example, in the presence of employment protection legislation (EPL),
where hiring a worker beyond a probation period triggers barriers to dismissal, or in the case
of relationship-speci￿c investments that accrue over time and raise ￿ring costs (see Mincer
(1962)).
The ￿exibility of the labor contract is also a key institutional feature, in particular whether
￿rms are restricted to the wage contract focused on in the e￿ciency wage literature, or
whether contractual instruments such as bonus pay or other forms of delayed compensation
are also available. Previous evidence indicates that bonus pay is a credible incentive device
in one-shot games, because ￿rms reward performance with bonuses, and punish shirking by
1See Williamson, Wachter, and Harris (1975) for a classic early study.INSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 2
withholding the bonus (Fehr, G￿chter, and Kirchsteiger (1997); Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt
(2007)). The availability of bonus pay thus has the potential to fundamentally change ￿rms’
contract enforcement policies in a repeated game setting. Furthermore, the availability of
bonus pay may be crucial for determining the impact of dismissal barriers, to the extent that
it provides ￿rms with an alternative incentive device to threat of ￿ring.
We begin by establishing a baseline condition (T-Baseline) in which there are no dismissal
barriers and no bonus pay. We use as our workhorse the experimental framework of Brown,
Falk, and Fehr (2004), in which ￿rms and workers can endogenously form long-term rela-
tionships. Firms o￿er contracts involving a wage and a desired e￿ort, and after accepting a
contract workers choose their e￿ort level, which is unenforceable.
Despite the contract enforcement problem, e￿ort levels in T-Baseline are on average quite
high. High e￿orts are observed mainly in long-term relationships. This re￿ects a policy
of ￿rms paying rents relative to unemployment, and credibly ￿ring poor performers. These
￿ndings corroborate those of Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004), and show the central importance
of ￿ring threat as an incentive device. This sets the stage for exploring our main research
questions.
We implement a second treatment (T-Barrier) in which there is a dismissal institution
present in the market, such that only the worker can end a relationship once the ￿rm chooses
to hire the worker two times in a row. The ￿rst time a ￿rm hires a worker thus corresponds to
a ￿probation￿ period, in which ￿ring is still possible. Firms are also restricted in their ability
to lower wages once they trigger dismissal protection by engaging in the second consecutive
contract, to rule out de facto dismissal by reducing wages to zero.
2
We predict three main e￿ects of the dismissal barrier institution. The ￿rst is a nega-
tive incentive e￿ect, due to removal of ￿ring threat as an incentive. Consistent with this
2Most legal jurisdictions view the reduction of wages to zero as equivalent to ￿ring a worker.INSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 3
prediction, average e￿ort levels in long-term relationships are far below those observed in
the baseline condition, which also leads to lower market e￿ciency. A second prediction is
a probation period e￿ect, such that worker e￿ort is especially high in the probation period,
due to the added attractiveness of enticing ￿rms into long-term relationships, and then drops
sharply once the worker is re-hired. Indeed, this pattern is pervasive in T-Barrier, whereas
in the baseline condition the opposite pattern is observed. The third prediction concerns a
set of related e￿ects on relationship-formation: ￿rms are predicted to be more reluctant to
enter relationships in a market with dismissal barriers, because of the incentive problem; the
prediction for turnover is ambiguous, because the tendency to engage in more one-shot inter-
actions is potentially o￿set by the tendency for relationships that do form not to break up;
dismissal barriers are predicted to have a systematic e￿ect on the shape of the distribution
for relationship lengths in the market, leading to more very short and also more very long
relationships. Observed behavior is supportive of all these relationship formation e￿ects.
In a third treatment (T-Barrier-Bonus) we implement both dismissal barriers and the
option for ￿rms to o￿er contractually non-enforceable bonuses as part of the initial contract.
After observing worker performance, ￿rms can decide how much of a bonus to actually pay.
The impact of dismissal barriers is dramatically altered by the presence of bonus pay.
Firms credibly reward worker performance by paying bonuses, and this additional incentive
device essentially eliminates the problem of worker shirking in long-term relationships, de-
spite the absence of ￿ring threat. Market e￿ciency is also substantially improved, and the
probation period e￿ect on e￿ort dynamics disappears. Relationship formation remains sig-
ni￿cantly di￿erent from baseline, however, with ￿rms being less prone to enter relationships,
despite the fact that worker performance in long-term relationships is no worse than in the
baseline condition. One potential explanation for this latter ￿nding is that bonus pay causesINSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 4
￿rms to rely less on relational incentives in general, because bonus pay and relationships act
as substitute incentive devices. This latter explanation cannot be veri￿ed without introduc-
ing a fourth treatment, where there is bonus pay but no confounding e￿ect of a dismissal
institution.
We brie￿y investigate behavior in such a treatment (T-Bonus). Firms are much less
prone to initiate long-term relationships when bonus pay is available, compared to the case
where there is no bonus pay, indicating that bonus pay and relational incentives are in
fact substitutes. Interestingly, T-Bonus also shows that in the absence of dismissal barriers
bonus pay does not have a strong advantage over wage contracts as a way of eliciting worker
performance. In the absence of dismissal barriers, the additional option to pay bonuses
improves market e￿ciency only marginally compared to a case (T-Baseline) where ￿rms
must rely on the combination of wages and ￿ring threat.
Taken together, the ￿ndings shed light on how enforcement behavior interacts with the
surrounding institutional environment. The negative incentive e￿ect of dismissal barriers de-
pends on the ￿exibility of the contracting technology, but while introducing contractual ￿exi-
bility reduces negative e￿ciency consequences, in other ways contract enforcement strategies
are left fundamentally changed. Though institutions impose constraints on contract enforce-
ment strategies, agents are not passive, but respond by ￿nding di￿erent avenues for solving
incentive problems. In other words, understanding strategic interactions within ￿rms re-
quires an appreciation of the institutions in which contractual relations are embedded, and
at the same time, understanding the impact of institutions requires an appreciation of how
they interact with details of ￿rms’ contract enforcement strategies.
Substantial progress has been made in previous theoretical work on the interplay of con-
tract enforcement and institutions, in settings with repeated interactions. Beginning withINSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 5
Telser (1980), there have been a number of contributions that use repeated game theory
to model the enforcement of incomplete contracts. Klein and Le￿er (1981), Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984) and Bowles (1985) show that the use of a high wage with the threat of ￿ring
can ensure performance. Bull (1987) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) introduce bonus
pay to the model, and show that a similar result holds, while Levin (2003) extends these
models to allow for asymmetric information in addition to contract incompleteness. These
papers restrict attention to the case of risk neutral agents, for which bonus pay does not typ-
ically play a substantive role in ensuring e￿ciency. Rather, in the spirit of the folk theorem
(Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)), there are many possible e￿cient equilibria. What bonus
pay does is a￿ect the distribution of the surplus between the worker and the ￿rm.
3
MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) show, in contrast, how the division of surplus can have
e￿ciency consequences, depending upon the relative supply of workers and capital. In par-
ticular, when capital is in short supply, then it is e￿cient to have it fully utilized, which is
possible under an e￿ciency wage contract, but not under a bonus pay contract. Our experi-
mental market corresponds to the case of a shortage of capital, given that the number of jobs
is always less than the number of workers. Thus, the theory predicts that the equilibrium
with e￿ciency wage contracts should be much more e￿cient, whereas we ￿nd that both wage
contracts and bonus contracts yield similar performance (in the absence of barriers).
There are a number of reasons why standard theory does not explain our results. First,
it is assumed that agents are in￿nitely lived, while in practice and in our experiments all
relationships are necessarily of ￿nite duration. Without additional assumptions, all of these
theories predict a dismal level of minimum e￿ciency in all of our treatments, due to standard
3Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) show that bonus pay has an important impact on surplus when the
￿rm also has available objective measures of performance. Pearce and Stacchetti (1998) extend these results
to the case of risk averse agents.INSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 6
backwards induction arguments. From previous experimental evidence on contract enforce-
ment behavior (e.g., Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993); Fehr and Falk (1999)), however,
it is known that in practice non-minimal e￿ciency is typically achieved even in one-shot in-
teractions with incomplete contracts. Beginning with Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson
(1982), it is well know that such behavior is consistent with the hypothesis that individuals
have social preferences that incorporate factors other than the pecuniary returns from a
decision. The di￿culty is that we do not have an established model of these preferences,
and hence as Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2007) observe, it is necessary to use experimental
evidence to uncover how speci￿c institutions will work with human subjects.
There are previous experimental studies on contract enforcement behavior, but to our
knowledge none on the important topic of how dismissal barriers a￿ect contract enforce-
ment, or on how the impact of dismissal barriers depends on other institutional features,
such as availability of bonus pay. This is partly because until recently experimental studies
have focused almost exclusively on static settings, whereas studying the incentive e￿ects of
dismissal barriers requires a setting with repeated interactions by its very nature.
4 Although
the focus of our paper is on the interaction of dismissal barriers and bonus pay, our results
also complement the experimental literature studying the question of how bonus contracts
perform relative to wage contracts. Fehr, G￿chter, and Kirchsteiger (1997) and Fehr, Klein,
and Schmidt (2007) ￿nd that bonus contracts perform much better than wage contracts in
terms of e￿ciency, in one-shot interactions. Our results qualify these ￿ndings somewhat,
showing that in a repeated game setting bonus contracts perform only slightly better than
wage contracts, with the di￿erence narrowing over time. The key di￿erence is that in re-
peated game settings ￿rms can combine wage contracts with threat of ￿ring, whereas in
4Wu and Roe (2007) also use the repeated-interaction framework of Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004), but focus
on varying the degree of incompleteness in contracts.INSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 7
one-shot games worker performance under a wage contract depends solely on altruistic or
reciprocal motives of the worker. On the other hand, our ￿ndings show that bonus pay does
have large bene￿ts relative to wage contracts, even in repeated game settings, if there are
some barriers to dismissal in the market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experiment, and Sec-
tion 3 outlines predictions for behavior. Section 4 presents results, and Section 5 concludes.
2. The Experiment
2.1. Design. The labor market operated for 18 trading periods. In each period a ￿rm could
hire at most one worker, and a worker could have at most one job. An individual period
involved two or three phases, depending on the treatment. The ￿rst phase was always a
market phase, in which the ￿rms made contract o￿ers and workers could only accept or
reject. Firms could make as many contract o￿ers as they wanted during the time limit of
three minutes; if one of a ￿rm’s contracts was accepted, all of the other o￿ers by that ￿rm
were immediately removed from the market.
5 In the case that a ￿rm and a worker agreed on
a contract, they entered a second phase in which the worker could decide how much e￿ort, e
to exert. In treatments where the contract o￿er could include an o￿ered bonus, there was a
third phase in which the ￿rm was informed about the worker’s e￿ort choice and could decide
how much of a bonus, b, to pay. Importantly, neither the worker’s e￿ort level or the ￿rm’s
bonus payment were restricted by the initial contract agreement, whereas a wage speci￿ed
in the agreement was binding. After the second (third) phase, the ￿rm and worker were
informed about their pro￿ts and earnings, respectively, and then a new period began.
5If all ￿rms had contracts, there was no potential for further trades. Thus, the market phase was designed to
end automatically after three minutes, or after the last ￿rm had a contract o￿er accepted, whichever came
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Contract o￿ers consisted of a wage, w, a desired e￿ort level, ~ e, and in some treatments
an o￿ered bonus, ~ b. The o￿er also included the ￿rm’s ID number. Firms could make two
types of contract o￿ers during the market phase: public o￿ers or private o￿ers. Public o￿ers
were observed by all workers, and thus could be accepted by any worker. Private o￿ers
were observed only by a worker speci￿ed by the ￿rm, and thus were available only to that
particular worker. In the case that a ￿rm made a private o￿er, the ￿rm speci￿ed a worker’s ID
number, in addition to the contract terms. Worker and ￿rm ID numbers remained constant
over the entire 18 periods, so it was possible for a ￿rm to intentionally make a private o￿er
to the same worker over multiple periods, and for a worker to recognize o￿ers coming from
a speci￿c ￿rm. This design made it possible for a ￿rm and worker to endogenously form a
long-term relationship, by choosing to repeatedly engage in private-o￿er contracts with each
other over multiple periods. Public o￿ers were a way for ￿rms to engage in a spot market
for labor rather than engaging in long-term relationships. During the market phase, ￿rms
were kept constantly informed about which workers had already accepted a contract, so as
to avoid having ￿rms make a private o￿er to a worker that was no longer available.
In treatments with the dismissal barrier institution, a ￿rm lost the ability to ￿re a worker
in the case that in two consecutive periods the worker had accepted a private o￿er from
that ￿rm. In other words, if a worker accepted a private o￿er from a ￿rm in period t, and
then accepted a second private o￿er from the same ￿rm in period t+1, the dismissal barrier
took e￿ect and only the worker could then end the relationship. In our experiment we thus
e￿ectively set the cost of ￿ring to in￿nity. Disallowing ￿ring, as opposed to introducing an
additional parameter capturing a ￿nite cost of ￿ring, has the advantage of simplifying an
already complex choice situation. It also provides a particularly tough test of the ability
of bonus pay to overcome the e￿ects of dismissal barriers. The fact that the dismissalINSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 9
barrier was activated only with the second consecutive contract captures a common feature
of EPL institutions, which is an initial probation period, during which the ￿rm is still able
to ￿re the worker. It also has an analogue in situations where there are relationship-speci￿c
investments that increase ￿ring costs, but where investments are made only after an initial
probation period.
Having chosen to hire the worker again, after the initial private o￿er, the dismissal barrier
took e￿ect and the ￿rm had to make an o￿er to that same worker at the beginning of each
subsequent period until the end of the game or until the worker decided to reject the ￿rm’s
o￿er. Firms who had chosen to trigger the dismissal barrier made subsequent o￿ers to the
same worker in a special phase before the market phase. Importantly, once the dismissal
barrier was activated, the wage o￿er had to be at least as high as in the previous period. Some
rigidity of the wage is required for a dismissal protection institution to work, otherwise a ￿rm
could e￿ectively ￿re a worker by reducing the wage to zero. 6 After ￿rms had made their o￿ers
required by the dismissal barrier institution, the market period began and workers protected
by the dismissal barrier could see the standing o￿er from their own ￿rm, in addition to the
other market activity. At any time, the worker could accept the standing o￿er, in which
case the ￿rm was informed. Alternatively, the worker could reject the o￿er by accepting
another contract in the market. As soon as the worker rejected the standing o￿er, the ￿rm
was informed, and allowed to make o￿ers during the remainder of the market phase.
In our design the e￿ort cost function for workers, described below, is the same across
all individuals so there are no di￿erences in ability. This allows us to focus on the moral
hazard problem in terms of e￿ort and bonus payment, without the complication of adverse
selection in terms of ability. We also do not implement cyclical shocks to market conditions,
6This is known as constructive dismissal, and is considered illegal in any jurisdiction with employment
protection. See Black’s Law Dictionary.INSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 10
or worker redundancies (multiple workers at one ￿rm). This simpli￿es an already complex
inter-temporal choice environment, and makes it possible to ￿rst understand the impact of
dismissal barriers on the strategic behavior surrounding the contract enforcement problem.
We implemented four treatments, as summarized in Table 1. In a treatment called T-
Baseline, contracts consisted of a binding wage, w, and a desired e￿ort level, ~ e. There was
no dismissal barrier institution in the market, so ￿rms could engage in as many private o￿ers
in a row with a worker as they wanted, while always having the option to not re-hire the
worker, i.e., not make the worker a private o￿er in the next period. 7 In T-Barrier, contracts
had the same form, but we introduced our dismissal barrier institution. In T-Barrier-Bonus,
the dismissal barrier institution was in e￿ect, but ￿rms had the option to o￿er a bonus, ~ b,
in addition to a wage. In T-Bonus, there was no dismissal barrier, but ￿rms had the option
to o￿er bonuses.
2.2. Parameters, Information Conditions, Procedure, and Subject Pool. All mar-
ket sessions lasted 18 periods, and had 7 ￿rms and 10 workers. The material payo￿ to a ￿rm





10  e   w   b if a contract o￿er was accepted
0 if no contract o￿er was accepted
and the payo￿ function for a worker was given by
7This treatment is a replication of the ICF treatment Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004), except that their design





w + b   c(e) if a contract o￿er was accepted
5 if no contract o￿er was accepted
where c(e) was a cost of e￿ort function, and 5 was the unemployment bene￿t in the case
that a worker did not engage in a trade. The wage, the o￿ered bonus, and the bonus actually
paid, b, could each take on an integer value 0;1;2;:::100. The desired e￿ort level and the
actual e￿ort level chosen by the worker, e, could take on integer values 1;2;:::;10. The e￿ort
cost function is shown in Table 2. The cost function is increasing and convex. Because the
marginal cost of e￿ort is at most 3, while the marginal bene￿t to a ￿rm is always 10, the
e￿cient e￿ort level is 10.
Payo￿ functions for workers and ￿rms, including the e￿ort cost function, were common
knowledge. Participants were aware that the market would last 18 periods. Reputations
could form bi-laterally: ￿rms learned about the e￿ort choices of workers that they traded
with, but did not observe e￿ort choices or bonus decisions, in interactions that they were
not a part of; workers learned about the bonus decisions of ￿rms that they encountered, but
not about worker e￿ort choices or ￿rm bonus decisions in other market interactions. Firms
observed all public o￿ers on the market during the market phase. Workers were informed not
only about private o￿ers they had received, but also about all public o￿ers on the market.
The experiment was computerized using Z-Tree software (Fischbacher (2007)). There was
an unpaid practice period before the experiment began, which consisted only of a market
phase but not the subsequent e￿ort or bonus phases, to give subjects experience with the
process of making and accepting o￿ers. After the practice period, the ￿rst period of the paid
experiment began. At the end of each period, a subject’s period pro￿ts were summarized,INSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 12
along with the pro￿ts of the trading partner in the case of a trade. Subjects were also
reminded of the partner’s ID number, the terms of the initial contract, the actual e￿ort
choice, and the actual bonus paid. Subjects could record this information on a separate
sheet of paper, ensuring that subjects were fully informed about their own trading history
over the course of the experiment. The experiment was framed neutrally, in terms of buyers
and sellers rather than workers and ￿rms. E￿ort was referred to as quality. This facilitates
comparison with Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004). who used the same neutral framing. Fehr,
Klein, and Schmidt (2007) show, however, that whether one uses framing as buyers and
sellers, or workers and ￿rms, is irrelevant for behavior in this class of experimental market
settings. Representative instructions are provided in an appendix at the end of the paper.
There were 408 participants in the experiment (see Table 1). We conducted six market
sessions for each of the four treatments, for a total of twenty-four sessions. Subjects were
students at the University of Bonn, from various ￿elds of study. No subject participated
in more than one session. On average, a session lasted roughly 100 minutes, and a subject
earned 25 Euros (approximately 32 USD).
3. Predictions
If it is common knowledge that workers and ￿rms are motivated only by their own material
payo￿s, then the prediction for behavior in T-Baseline involves a very ine￿cient outcome.
Workers will choose e = 1 in the ￿nal period, regardless of the agreed-upon contract fw;e eg.
Firms will ￿nd it optimal in the ￿nal period to o￿er wages that just compensate the worker
for the outside option. All seven contract o￿ers will be accepted. By backward induction,
the same outcome will be realized in all previous periods, with the small surplus generated
by the workers’ minimal e￿ort being claimed entirely by the ￿rms.INSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 13
If material self-interest of ￿rms and workers is not common knowledge, however, predic-
tions change dramatically. Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004) show theoretically that a su￿cient
number of fair-minded subjects, who respond to generous wages with high e￿ort even in the
absence of strategic incentives to do so, is su￿cient to sustain an equilibrium in which all
workers provide high e￿ort levels in early market periods, and only the fair workers provide
non-minimal e￿ort in the ￿nal market period. The key mechanism for eliciting high e￿ort
from sel￿sh workers (sel￿sh in the sense of caring only about own material payo￿s) is the
existence of a rent in the ￿nal period, which arises because the presence of some fair workers
makes it pro￿table (and therefore credible) for ￿rms to pay generous wages even when there
is no prospect for future interactions. The possibility of a future rent, and the threat of
￿ring, discipline even sel￿sh workers in the second-to-last period. Because only the future
rent matters for sel￿sh workers’ incentives, ￿rms could be expected to pay a low or zero rent
in period 17. Given the plausible belief that the lack of a rent in the current period signals
that a ￿rm will not pay a rent in the future, however, ￿rms will have an incentive to pay a
rent even in this period.
MacLeod (2007) observes that the key feature in this argument is the existence of some rent
in the last period, which may also be generated by individuals who have taste for performing
as promised. This implies that in the second to last period, regardless of one’s type, there
will be a gain from continuing the relationship. MacLeod (2007) shows that a backwards
induction argument implies that one very quickly obtains performance that is close to the
￿rst best in earlier periods.
These observations lead to several qualitative predictions for contract enforcement be-
havior in T-Baseline. Firms are predicted to trade repeatedly with the same worker if he
performed well in the past. For this reason ￿rms will rely on private o￿ers, because in theINSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 14
case of public o￿ers ￿rms make the o￿er available to all workers regardless of past perfor-
mance. In order for the possibility of future interactions to provide an incentive, the ￿rm
will need to pay a generous wage that o￿ers a rent relative to being unemployed, and thus
workers are predicted to gain some of the surplus from trade. Some workers are predicted
to perform well even in the ￿nal period, in response to a generous wage, re￿ecting fair-
ness concerns. Other workers who are concerned only with material payo￿s will imitate fair
workers in early market periods, but will reduce e￿ort to the minimum in the ￿nal market
period when the threat of ￿ring no longer has an impact. These predictions are part of a
particular equilibrium, but it is well known that in repeated games there exists a plethora
of equilibria (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)). This highlights the need to perform
an experiment, in order to determine which equilibrium is selected. Brown, Falk, and Fehr
(2004) ￿nd empirical support for these predictions, and our analysis in T-Baseline replicates
their results, setting the stage for answering our main research questions.
The ￿rst question is how a dismissal barrier institution a￿ects contract enforcement be-
havior in a setting with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. We identify three
main predictions regarding the impact of dismissal barriers. The ￿rst prediction is a nega-
tive incentive e￿ect: in long-term relationships, the dismissal barrier institution removes the
threat of ￿ring as an incentive device; as a result, sel￿sh workers are predicted to shirk in
long-term relationships in T-Barrier, leading to lower e￿ort levels than in T-Baseline. The
second prediction is a probation period e￿ect: dismissal barriers are predicted to change
e￿ort dynamics, such that e￿ort is especially high in the initial probation period, because
workers have a greater bene￿t from entering long-term relationships, and then drops sharply
once the ￿rm commits do a long-term relationship, due to the removal of ￿ring threat as anINSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 15
incentive. The third prediction concerns relationship formation e￿ect s. Firms face a distri-
bution of worker types, some who perform in the absence of ￿ring threat and some who do
not, but the fact that average performance declines in long-run relationships is predicted to
make ￿rms more reluctant to enter long-term relationships in T-Barrier than in T-Baseline.
The implication for the average length of relationships is ambiguous. Relationship avoidance
creates a larger number of one-shot relationships, but dismissal barriers imply that relation-
ships that do form are likely to be long lasting, because ￿rms are unable to ￿re workers. The
unambiguous prediction is a change in the distribution of relationship lengths, such that the
distribution has more very short but also more long lasting relationships in T-Barrier.
The next question is how the impact of dismissal barriers interacts with the addition of
bonus pay. In line with evidence from one-shot settings (Fehr, G￿chter, and Kirchsteiger
(1997)), ￿rms are predicted to pay bonuses for performing workers, creating a credible in-
centive for workers to perform even in the absence of ￿ring threat. As a result, ￿rms are
predicted to circumvent the negative incentive e￿ect of dismissal barriers by using bonus
pay, so that e￿ort in long-term relations is higher in T-Barrier-Bonus than in T-Barrier.
Furthermore, because incentives are high powered even after the probation period, there
will be a less pronounced probation e￿ect in T-Barrier-Bonus compared to T-Barrier. The
prediction for relationship formation is ambiguous. On the one hand, ￿rms should be less
reluctant to enter relationships since the hold-up problem is mitigated. On the other hand
they have another incentive tool at their disposal, and therefore may rely less on relational
contracting in the ￿rst place.
This latter point raises the question how contract enforcement is a￿ected by bonus pay in
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could re￿ect a general tendency for bonus pay to lead ￿rms to substitute away from rela-
tional incentives. This cannot be answered by T-Barrier-Bonus, because of the confounding
presence of dismissal barriers, and requires the fourth treatment T-Bonus. In the ￿nal results
section we brie￿y discuss the impact of bonus pay per se on contract enforcement, compared
to T-Baseline.
4. Results
4.1. Contract Enforcement in the Baseline Condition. To set the stage, we ￿rst study
T-Baseline, where there is no dismissal barrier institution and no bonus pay. A ￿rst obser-
vation is that worker e￿ort levels in T-Baseline are quite high, despite the fact that the
sub-game perfect prediction for the stage game is an e￿ort level of 1. The modal e￿ort level
across all periods is 10, the median is 7, and the mean is 6:39 (these values are very similar
to those obtained in Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004)). The question then is how ￿rms elicit
relatively high worker e￿ort levels, in spite of the contract enforcement problem.
One clue is that high e￿ort levels are mainly observed in private o￿er contracts, which
are typically part of long-term relationships. Long-term relationships arise when a ￿rm and
worker endogenously choose to engage in sequence of two or more consecutive private o￿er
contracts with each other. Of all contracts, 67 percent are private o￿ers, and of these roughly
64 percent end up being part of a relationship lasting at least 5 periods. The level of e￿ort
in a given interaction is also strongly predictive of the ultimate length of the relationship:
the correlation between e￿ort and ultimate length is 0:64 (Spearman; p < 0:001)
Figure 1 shows that high e￿ort levels and long-lasting relationships go together, due to
the contract enforcement strategy of ￿rms: ￿rms continue a relationship only in the case
that the worker performed well in the previous period. For low e￿ort levels, the probability
that the ￿rm terminates the relationship is close to 1, and for the maximum e￿ort level theINSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 17
probability is close to zero. We also estimated a Probit regression, where the dependent
variable is 1 in the case a worker is not rehired with a private o￿er and zero otherwise, and
￿nd that the estimated impact of an additional unit of e￿ort in the previous period on the
probability of termination is  0:104 (p < 0:001; robust s.e., clustering on session).
[Figure 1 about here]
The policy of credibly punishing poor performance with termination provides a material
incentive for workers to perform, if workers ￿nd continuing the relationship more attractive
than the alternative. The alternatives are either accepting a public o￿er, if one is available,
or unemployment. In fact, workers in private o￿er contracts earn 34:75 on average, compared
to 24:06 in public-o￿er interactions, or 5 from being unemployed. A similar picture emerges
when one considers the total rents from being hired with a private o￿er in a given market
period. For each period t we calculate a proxy for total rents by summing up current and
future earnings, from t to T = 18, for all workers who are in a private o￿er contract in
period t. We compare the average of this value for a given period, denoted Vpriv, to the
average current and future earnings of workers who are in a public o￿er contract in the
same period, and workers who are unemployed, denoted Vpub and Vu, respectively. The
di￿erences Vpriv   Vpub and Vpriv   Vu are positive in every market period. Thus, threat
of ￿ring serves as a credible incentive device, because ￿ring imposes a cost on workers in
the form of foregone rents. Workers earn a sizable rent even in the ￿nal period, which is
important for sustaining an equilibrium with high e￿ort levels in early periods. Workers
earn rents, despite putting in high e￿ort, because ￿rms pay substantially higher (e￿ciency)
wages in long-term relationships: median wages are 55 in private o￿er contracts, compared
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also pro￿table for ￿rms. Average ￿rm pro￿ts in private o￿er contracts are 29:84, compared
to 13:05 in public o￿er contracts.
Underlining the importance of threat of ￿ring, 58:33 percent of workers who are re-hired
in the ￿nal period reduce e￿ort relative to their e￿ort in period 17, and 35:71 percent choose
an e￿ort level of 1, despite having chosen an e￿ort of 10 in the previous period. Firms
reduce wages somewhat in the ￿nal period, perhaps anticipating this behavior, but there is
a signi￿cant drop in e￿ort, even controlling for di￿erences in o￿ered contract terms. 8
A sub-sample of workers performs well in response to generous wages, even in the ￿nal
market period. Regressing e￿ort levels in the ￿nal period on wages yields a positive coe￿-
cient on wages of 0:185, signi￿cant at the one percent level (interval regression; robust s.e.,
clustering on session).9 This behavior is consistent with previous evidence indicating that
some individuals have reciprocal inclinations, rewarding generous wages with high e￿ort,
even in the absence of strategic considerations (for a review see Fehr and G￿chter (2000)).
Thus, although threat of ￿ring is clearly important for motivating many of the worker sub-
jects, for a sub-population fairness concerns are also relevant. The presence of such types is
important for deriving the equilibrium described in Section 3.
In summary, ￿rms use a combination of rents and threat of ￿ring to solve the contract
enforcement problem in T-Baseline, consistent with the disciplining version of e￿ciency wage
theory (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)). At the same time, the ￿ndings are also supportive of the
fairness version of e￿ciency wage theory (Akerlof (1982), Akerlof and Yellen (1990)), in the
8This result is based on using the sample of contracts concluded in period 17 and 18, and regressing the
di￿erence in e￿ort between period 18 and period 17 on a dummy variable for ￿nal period, wages, desired
e￿ort, and a constant. The OLS estimate for the ￿nal-period dummy is  3:004 (p < 0:008; robust s.e.,
clustering on session), indicating that e￿ort drops signi￿cantly in period 18 relative to 17, controlling for
contract o￿ers in period 17 and 18.
9For a discussion of interval regression, see footnote 9 below.INSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 19
sense that a sub-population responds to generous wages with high e￿ort even without ￿ring
threat. These results provide a baseline for investigation of our main research questions.
4.2. Contract Enforcement and Dismissal Barriers. We now turn to how dismissal
barriers a￿ect the strategic interactions of workers and ￿rms, in an e￿ciency wage setting.
We compare behavior in T-Baseline to behavior in T-Barrier, exploiting the exogenous vari-
ation in the presence of a dismissal barrier institution across treatments, while the form of
the labor contract (￿xed wages and no bonus pay) is held constant.
The ￿rst way in which dismissal barriers are predicted to a￿ect the equilibrium described
in Section 3 is by creating a negative incentive e￿ect, such that (self-interested) workers
are more prone to shirk in long-term relationships. Long-term relationships are de￿ned
as interactions that involve at least two consecutive private o￿er contracts between the
same worker and ￿rm. Average e￿ort in long-term relationships is 8:4 in T-Baseline but
only 5:5 in T-Barrier, providing initial support for the prediction. This di￿erence is highly
statistically signi￿cant using each session as one independent observation (Mann-Whitney;
p < 0:01).10 Median e￿orts are also strikingly di￿erent, 10 and 5, respectively (Mann-
Whitney; p < 0:012). Figure 2 shows that the e￿ort di￿erences in long-term relationships
are large and stable across market periods, with e￿ort being lower in T-Barrier than in
T-Baseline in every market period.
[Figure 2 about here]
Table 3 investigates this issue using regression analysis. The dependent variable in each
column is worker e￿ort in trades occurring as part of a long-term relationship, and coe￿cients
are marginal e￿ects from interval regressions, to account for the fact that the dependent
10All non-parametric tests in the analysis take one session to be an independent observation.INSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 20
variable is measured in intervals and thus is left and right censored. 11 Standard errors are
robust, and are adjusted for clustering on session to account for possible correlation of error
terms within a given session.12 In Column (1), we regress e￿ort on a dummy for T-Barrier
and a constant (omitted category is T-Baseline). The coe￿cient on the treatment dummy is
negative and highly signi￿cant, indicating that dismissal barriers lead to lower e￿ort levels
in long-term relationships. The treatment e￿ect remains negative and signi￿cant in Column
(2) where we control for other factors that might a￿ect e￿ort: wages, desired e￿ort, and a
time trend.
[Table 3 about here]
If the drop in e￿ort re￿ects the removal of ￿ring threat as an incentive device, we should
observe less of a di￿erence in one-shot interactions, where the institution does not a￿ect
ability to dismiss poor performers. Estimating similar regression to those in Table 3, but
using worker e￿ort decisions in one-shot interactions (public o￿er, or private o￿er contracts
that are not renewed), we do not observe a de￿cit in T-Barrier e￿ort levels relative to T-
Baseline. In fact, e￿ort levels are somewhat higher in one-shot interactions in T-Barrier
than in T-Baseline. Later in the analysis we turn to possible reasons for the even better
performance of workers in one-shot interactions in T-Barrier. The important point for the
issue at hand is that e￿ort levels are lower in T-Barrier precisely in situations where the
11The interval regression procedure maximizes a likelihood function that is a natural generalization of a Tobit,
treating each value as a left and right censored observation coming from an interval with known bounds. Error
terms are assumed to be normally distributed. For more information, see the STATA reference manual on
the intreg procedure listed under Tobit estimation. We ￿nd similar results if we instead estimate regressions
using OLS.
12In this and other regressions, our conclusions are similar if we do not adjust for clustering, although
standard errors are typically smaller and e￿ects are even more signi￿cant.INSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 21
institution makes a di￿erence for ￿ring threat, consistent with the negative incentive e￿ect
prediction.
It is noteworthy that aggregate e￿ciency is substantially lower in T-Barrier than in T-
Baseline, indicating that the negative incentive e￿ect in long-term relationships dominates
any tendency for dismissal barriers to enhance performance in one-shot interactions. Figure
3 shows the total economic surplus generated by trades in a given market period (averaged
across sessions), relative to the maximum possible surplus. 13 Whereas e￿ciency is 63:86
percent of the maximum in T-Baseline overall, e￿ciency is substantially lower in T-Barrier,
about 52 percent, and the di￿erence is growing over time. Starting around period 6, e￿ciency
in T-Baseline begins to climb steeply, as relationships begin to form, and leaves e￿ciency in
T-Barrier behind. From period 10 through 17, for example, e￿ciency in T-Baseline is about
19 percentage points, or 34 percent, higher than in T-Barrier (Mann-Whitney; p < 0:05).
[Figure 3 about here]
Result 1: In a market with wage contracts, dismissal barriers cause signi￿cantly lower
worker e￿ort levels in long-term relationships, and lower market e￿ciency.
The next prediction concerns the dynamics of worker e￿ort provision. The dismissal
barrier institution prevents ￿rms from using the threat of ￿ring once a ￿rm chooses to
extend the relationship beyond the initial private o￿er contract, which we refer to as the
￿probation￿ period. Workers are predicted to sharply reduce e￿ort relative to performance
in the probation period, as soon as they are o￿ered and accept a second private o￿er in
a row from the same ￿rm. This behavior would also shed further light on the negative
13Total surplus is ￿rm revenues, minus worker e￿ort costs and opportunity costs in terms of unemployment
bene￿ts. With 7 ￿rms in each session, the maximum possible surplus in a period is equal to 7(1010 18 5) =
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incentive e￿ect of the dismissal institution, by con￿rming that the lower e￿ort levels in long-
term relationships in T-Barrier re￿ect a within-individual moral hazard response, rather than
other potential factors, for example a di￿erent composition of types who end up in long-term
relationships in T-Barrier.
The probability of an e￿ort drop is much larger in T-Barrier than in T-Baseline, and the
size of the di￿erence is also larger, supporting the prediction. The unconditional probability
that a worker reduces e￿ort in the second period of a relationship is 0:54, compared to 0:23,
in T-Baseline. Furthermore, the average drop is equal to  1:57 in T-Barrier, while the
average change in e￿ort is actually positive in T-Baseline, equal to 0:11.
Figure 4 compares median e￿ort, and also the distribution of e￿ort, before and after
the probation period. The sample is restricted to individuals who are ultimately rehired
after the probationary period, so results for probationary and all later periods are based on
the same sample of individuals. The boxes indicate the inter-quartile ranges (25th to 75th
percentile) of the e￿ort distributions, and the circular markers indicate the median e￿ort
levels. In T-Barrier, median e￿ort drops sharply in later relationship periods relative to the
probation period, and there is a substantial increase in the variance of e￿ort. The opposite
pattern is observed in T-Baseline. Results are similar if we instead compare e￿ort in the
probation period to e￿ort in the second period of relationships only; the drop in e￿ort in
T-Barrier is immediate, occurring as soon as the probation period is passed, whereas e￿ort
increases in T-Baseline (see also Table 4, where we focus on comparing e￿ort in the second
relationship period to e￿ort in the probation period). Thus, dismissal barriers lead to a
post-probation-period drop in median e￿ort, and an increase in e￿ort variance in long-term
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The distribution in Figure 4 also reveals that there are still some workers in T-Barrier
who choose close to maximum e￿ort. This is consistent with the presence of some fair types
who perform well even when dismissal barriers eliminate ￿ring threat.
[Figure 4 about here]
Table 4 investigates the probation period e￿ect on e￿ort dynamics using regression anal-
ysis. The sample comprises all private-o￿er contracts taking place in the second period of a
long-term relationship. The dependent variable in each column is equal to 1 if e￿ort dropped
relative to the ￿rst period of the relationship, and zero otherwise. Coe￿cients are marginal
e￿ects. Column (1) indicates that the probability of e￿ort dropping is signi￿cantly larger in
T-Barrier compared to T-Baseline, and Column (2) shows that this is still true conditioning
on characteristics of the previous period interaction, and the contract terms in the current
period, as well as a time trend.
[Table 4 about here]
Dismissal barriers are also predicted to have an impact on the level of e￿ort in the initial
probation period, because workers are willing to work even harder to entice the ￿rm into
making a second private o￿er. This motivation comes from the fact that workers anticipate
enjoying a stronger strategic position once they get to enter a long-term relationship. Re-
turning to Figure 4, it is evident that median e￿ort is in fact higher in the probation period
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regression using only initial private o￿er contracts that subsequently lead to long-term rela-
tionships shows that the e￿ort level is higher by 0:629 points on average after controlling for
wages, desired e￿ort, and a time trend (p < 0:017; robust s.e., clustering on session). 14
This suggests that dismissal barriers might also a￿ect the type of workers who enter long-
term relationships. For example, workers who are strategic and motivated only by material
payo￿s might be better at signaling to ￿rms during the probation period that they have
an intention to work hard in long-term relationships. One way to assess the proportion of
sel￿sh versus fair types who end up in long-term relationships is to look at the sensitivity of
e￿ort levels to wages in the ￿nal market period. The greater the fraction of sel￿sh workers,
the less sensitive e￿ort should be to high wage o￿ers. Using all private o￿er contracts in the
￿nal period, which were part of an on-going relationship in the previous period, we regressed
e￿ort on wages (interval regression; robust s.e. clustering on session). The impact of wages
is positive but not signi￿cant in T-Barrier (p < 0:124), whereas the impact of wages on and
signi￿cant in T-Baseline (p < 0:001).15 Thus, there is some suggestive evidence of a type of
adverse selection, in terms of worker propensity to shirk, despite the fact that cost functions
are held constant and thus there is no scope for adverse selection in the typical sense of
worker ability di￿erences.
14As noted above in our analysis of the negative incentive e￿ect, e￿ort levels in one-shot interactions are
also higher in T-Barrier than in T-Baseline, and signi￿cantly so. With the exception of trades occurring in
period 18, where there is no potential for being re-hired, these one-shot interactions can also be interpreted
as probation periods, albeit ones that were unsuccessful. We estimate an interval regression where the
dependent variable is worker e￿ort levels in one-shot interactions, excluding trades in period 18, and ￿nd
that e￿ort is higher in T-Barrier than in T-Baseline: the di￿erence in e￿ort levels is 0:879 (p < 0:044; robust
s.e., clustering on session). This behavior is consistent with the existence of a heterogeneous population of
types and the fact that individuals understand this, and therefore attempt to signal their good characteristics
with high e￿ort during the probation period.
15It turns out that in T-Barrier and T-Baseline, the number of private-o￿er contracts in long-term relation-
ships in period 18 is exactly the same, so the di￿erence in signi￿cance levels does not simply re￿ect di￿erent
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Result 2: In a market with wage contracts dismissal barriers there is a probation period
e￿ect, such that workers reduce e￿ort sharply as soon as the ￿rm triggers dismissal barriers
by re-hiring the worker beyond the initial contract. The variance of e￿ort also increases. In
the absence of dismissal barriers the opposite pattern occurs. Dismissal barriers also have
an additional, positive incentive e￿ect, such that the level of e￿ort in the probation period is
even higher than in a market without dismissal barriers.
Although ￿rms face a distribution of worker types, and thus uncertainty about the out-
come of entering a long-term relationship, the fact that on average performance su￿ers is
predicted to make ￿rms less likely to enter relationships in the ￿rst place. Consistent with
the prediction of relationship avoidance we ￿nd that 58 percent of all contracts were in one-
shot interactions in T-Barrier, compared to 48 percent in T-Baseline. Even more tellingly,
we observe 23 percent of all ￿rms in T-Barrier pursuing a strategy of strict relationship-
avoidance, never making two private o￿ers in a row to the same worker, during the entire
game. This contrasts with only 9 percent of ￿rms exhibiting this strategy in T-Baseline
where dismissal barriers are absent. Put another way, the probability that a ￿rm has never
been in a long-term relationship as of market period t is consistently higher in T-Barrier than
in T-Baseline. We estimate a Cox proportional hazard model, and ￿nd that this survival
probability is higher in T-Barrier compared to T-Baseline. This di￿erence is only marginally
signi￿cant overall (p < 0:07; robust s.e., clustering on session), re￿ecting the fact that the
survival probabilities are close to 1 in both treatments for the ￿rst few market periods; in
general long-term relationships do not form until after the ￿rst few market periods, during
which ￿rms appear to engage in a process of search. Considering market periods beyond pe-
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is slower in T-Barrier, leading to a large di￿erence that is statistically signi￿cant at the ￿ve
percent level (p < 0:043; robust s.e., clustering on session).
The barrier institution prevents ￿rms from dismissing workers, which makes it less likely
that relationships that do form will break up. This latter tendency is reinforced by the fact
that workers essentially never quit once they are protected by dismissal barriers. Workers
opt out of a relationship protected by dismissal barriers in only 3 out of 283 such contracts,
which is understandable given that in T-Barrier worker earnings are about 48 percent higher
on average in long-term relationships than in one-shot interactions. It turns out that the
rate of turnover, measured as the average length of a relationship, is essentially the same in
T-Barrier and T-Baseline: 5:99 periods versus 5:89. Thus, the resulting stability of long-term
relationships happens to just o￿set the tendency for ￿rms to avoid relationships.
Figure 5 shows that dismissal barriers change the distribution of relationship lengths in
the market. The fractions of relationships in the two most extreme categories, which include
one-shot interactions or long-term relationships lasting 14 periods or more, respectively, are
higher in T-Barrier than in T-Baseline. The opposite is true for the three intermediate
categories of relationship lengths. A Probit regression shows that probability of observing a
relationship in one of the two extreme categories is signi￿cantly higher in T-Barrier than in
T-Baseline (p < 0:001; robust s.e., clustering on session).
[Figure 5 about here]
Result 3: In a market with wage contracts, ￿rms are more reluctant to enter long-term
relationships in the presence of the dismissal barrier institution. They also cannot terminate
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becomes more bi-modal at the extremes, with more one-shot interactions but also more very
long relationships.
4.3. Dismissal Barriers and Bonus Pay. In T-Barrier-Bonus, we add the option for
￿rms to pay bonuses. For bonus pay to serve as an incentive device, ￿rms must credibly
reward worker e￿ort with bonus payments. Figure 6 shows that bonus payments are in
fact strongly increasing in worker performance, and thus that bonus payments are credible.
We also regressed actual bonus payments in period t on worker e￿ort levels in t (interval
regression), and found that the relationship between e￿ort and bonus payments is positive
and highly statistically signi￿cant, controlling for wages, desired e￿ort, and a time trend
(p < 0:001; robust s.e., clustering on session).
[Figure 6 about here]
With bonus pay serving as a credible incentive device, ￿rms have a way to at least partially
circumvent the negative incentive e￿ect created by dismissal barriers. Figure 2 shows that,
indeed, worker e￿ort levels in long-term relationships are consistently much higher in T-
Barrier-Bonus than in T-Barrier (average e￿ort is 8:2 rather than 5:5), and achieve a level
very close to what is observed in T-Baseline. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 indicate that the
di￿erence in e￿ort levels is positive and statistically signi￿cant when comparing T-Barrier-
Bonus to T-Barrier, controlling for other variables relevant for e￿ort. Columns (5) and
(6) con￿rm that e￿ort levels in T-Barrier-Bonus are not signi￿cantly di￿erent from e￿ort
levels in T-Baseline. Thus, the option to pay bonuses allows ￿rms to undo the negative
e￿ects of dismissal barriers. As shown in Figure 3, bonus pay also undoes much of the
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substantially above that in T-Barrier, by about 10 percentage points, or an increase of 20
percent (Mann-Whitney; p < 0:055). On the other hand e￿ciency is only about 1 percentage
point, or 2 percent, lower than e￿ciency in T-Baseline, and the di￿erence is not statistically
signi￿cant (Mann Whitney; p < 0:87).
Given that the negative incentive e￿ect of dismissal barriers is largely neutralized by bonus
pay, e￿ort dynamics are predicted to be more similar to those observed in T-Baseline. Figure
4 supports this prediction. The median e￿ort level increases after the probation period, and
variance decreases, similar to what is observed in T-Baseline. The level of e￿ort in the
initial period of relationships is also similar to that in T-Baseline, consistent with bonus pay
reducing the incentive for workers to entice ￿rms into relationships. Columns (3) and (4) of
Table 4 reveal that the probability of a drop in e￿ort is signi￿cantly lower in T-Barrier-Bonus
than in T-Barrier, and Columns (5) and (6) show that the probability of a drop in e￿ort in
T-Barrier-Bonus is not statistically di￿erent from in T-Baseline.
While ￿rms have less reason to avoid relationships in T-Barrier-bonus, because bonus pay
helps solve the incentive problem, bonus pay also provides a substitute for relational incen-
tives, and thus ￿rms may be less interested in entering relationships for this reason. The
fraction of ￿rms who never enter a long-term relationship in T-Barrier-Bonus is 19 percent,
somewhat lower than in T-Barrier where the fraction is 24 percent, but substantially above
the 9 percent observed in T-Baseline. The survival probability of never having entered a re-
lationship also indicates that ￿rms in T-Barrier-Bonus are more prone to avoid relationships
than ￿rms in T-Baseline. A Cox mixed proportional hazard model shows that the survival
probability is signi￿cantly higher than in T-Baseline ( p < 0:026; robust s.e., clustering on
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di￿erent (p < 0:79; robust s.e., clustering on session). Thus, the tendency to avoid relation-
ships is similar to in T-Barrier, despite the lack of a strong negative incentive problem. This
￿nding is consistent with bonus pay changing the way that ￿rms enforce contracts, such that
they substitute away from relational incentives to one-shot interactions and the use of bonus
incentives. To attribute this change to the e￿ect of bonus pay, however, requires our fourth
treatment, T-Bonus, where we observe the impact of bonus pay without the confounding
e￿ect of dismissal barriers. We turn to this comparison in the next section.
Result 4: The presence of bonus pay strongly a￿ects the impact of the dismissal barrier
institution, eliminating both the negative incentive e￿ect and probation period e￿ect. Re-
lationship initiation, however, remains altered relative to T-Baseline, with ￿rms being less
likely to enter long-term relationships.
4.4. Impact of Bonus Pay in the Absence of Dismissal Barriers. In T-Bonus ￿rms
have the option to pay bonuses, but there is no dismissal institution in the market. This
allows us to isolate the impact of bonus pay per se on contract enforcement policies and
market outcomes.
If bonus pay and relationships are substitutes in the contract enforcement policies of ￿rms
(which would help explain the low rate of relationship formation in T-Barrier-Bonus), then
introducing bonus pay should lead to fewer and shorter long-term relationships, compared
to a market where labor contracts are restricted to ￿xed wages. In fact, 17 percent of ￿rms
never try to enter a long-term relationship in T-Bonus, substantially larger than the 9 percent
observed in T-Baseline. A Cox proportional hazard model tells a similar story, showing that
the survival probability for never having entered a long-run relationship is higher in T-Bonus
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beyond 5 (p < 0:018; robust s.e., clustering on session). The average length of a relationship
in T-Bonus is 2:2, shorter than in T-Baseline or any of the other treatments. Figure 5 shows
that the distribution of relationship lengths is not bi-modal in T-Bonus, as in the other
treatments, but rather has a single mode in the category of one-shot interactions and the
next highest fraction in the category of relationships lasting only 2 to 5 periods. In other
words, bonus pay leads to a leftward shift in the distribution, away from longer relationships.
For example, a Probit regression shows that the probability of observing a relationship in the
longest length category of 14 or more is signi￿cantly lower in T-Bonus than in T-Baseline
(p < 0:048; robust s.e., clustering on session). These ￿ndings indicate that bonus pay and
relational incentives are in fact substitutes, and helps explain why there is a relatively low
rate of relationship formation in T-Barrier-Bonus, despite the lack of a negative incentive
e￿ect in long-term relationships. While the introduction of bonus pay neutralizes most of the
e￿ects of dismissal barriers, it leaves contract enforcement policies fundamentally changed
by providing an alternative strategy for contract enforcement.
T-Bonus also provides a useful counter-factual for T-Barrier-Bonus, helping disentangle
the impact of dismissal barriers from the e￿ect of bonus pay on the strategic position of
workers and ￿rms. In particular, although ￿rms achieve a high level of worker performance
in long-term relationships in T-Barrier-Bonus, comparable to in T-Bonus (see Figure 2), the
lack of ￿ring threat caused by dismissal barriers would seem to weaken the strategic position
of ￿rms. Figure 6 shows that in fact ￿rms in T-Barrier-Bonus pay higher bonuses compared
to ￿rms in T-Bonus, to achieve the same level of performance, especially at higher e￿ort
levels. In a regression of actual bonus payment on worker e￿ort, the wage, desired e￿ort,
a time trend, and a dummy variable for T-Barrier-Bonus (omitted category T-Bonus), the
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indicating that for a given wage and e￿ort, ￿rms must pay a higher bonus when dismissal
barriers are present in the market. This can also be seen by looking at total rents o￿ered
to workers in a given market period, calculated in the same way as in the initial analysis of
T-Baseline above. Workers earn larger rents in T-Barrier-Bonus than in T-Bonus, in every
market period.16 Thus, although bonus pay allows ￿rms to largely circumvent the negative
incentive e￿ect of dismissal barriers in T-Barrier-Bonus, dismissal barriers still impose a cost
on ￿rms. Put another way, the availability of ￿ring threat allows ￿rms to achieve the same
level of worker performance with lower bonuses and lower o￿ered rents.
Recent studies have compared the e￿ciency of bonus versus wage contracts in one-shot in-
teractions, and found that bonus contracts are much superior (e.g., Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt
(2007)), which raises the question how bonus contracts fare relative to wage contracts in a
setting with repeated interactions. The di￿erence we ￿nd is positive but relatively small: ag-
gregate e￿ciency is 68:54 percent of maximum in T-Bonus compared to 63:86 in T-Baseline
(see also Figure 3). One explanation for the relatively good performance of wage contracts
is that in a setting with repeated interactions ￿rms can employ ￿ring threat as an incentive
device, whereas in one-shot settings the only reason for a worker to perform under a ￿xed
wage contract is fairness preferences.
Result 5: Bonus pay causes ￿rms to substitute away from relational incentives in their
contract enforcement policies. Although bonus pay allows ￿rms to o￿set negative incentive
e￿ects of dismissal barriers, dismissal barriers still impose a cost on ￿rms by requiring ￿rms
to pay a higher bonus and o￿er higher rents for a given level of e￿ort. The bene￿ts of bonus
pay per se for market e￿ciency, relative to e￿ciency wage contracts, is decreasing over time.
16Taking the average worker rent from being employed in a given session as one independent observation,
rents o￿ered by ￿rms in sessions for the T-Barrier-Bonus treatment are signi￿cantly higher than those o￿ered
by ￿rms in the T-Bonus treatment (Mann-Whitney; p<0.007). Detailed results available upon request.INSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 32
5. Discussion
This paper explores how the complex interplay between contract enforcement behaviors
and embedding institutions determines market outcomes. With incomplete contracts and
repeated interactions, ￿ring threat is crucial for market e￿ciency, and dismissal barriers
worsen performance by hindering this mechanism and by discouraging relationship formation
in the ￿rst place. Allowing for greater ￿exibility in contractual instruments, in the form
of bonus pay, undoes the e￿ects of dismissal barriers, while leaving contract enforcement
strategies fundamentally changed.
Our paper is also complementary to the empirical literature that studies dismissal barriers
in the form of employment protection legislation (EPL). Our results show that the impact
of dismissal barriers depends crucially on details of the institutional environment. This is
consistent with the empirical literature, which sometimes ￿nds zero and other times ￿nds
moderate e￿ects of EPL on various types of outcomes (e.g., Lazear (1990), Nickell (1997),
Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006), MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007)). Furthermore, our
￿ndings highlight a speci￿c institutional feature that is relevant for whether dismissal barriers
have a strong or weak e￿ect on market performance, namely ￿exibility of the labor contract.
In the spirit of the Coasian intuition articulated by Lazear (1990), we ￿nd that giving parties
additional contractual instruments allows them to contract around the negative e￿ects of
dismissal barriers. As noted by Krueger (1991), a key challenge for assessing the impact of
EPL in the ￿eld is that the law change itself might be correlated with other factors that are
related to economic performance. 17 In this regard our experimental approach is also useful,
because variation in institutions is clearly exogenous. Finally, our results are supportive of
other ￿eld evidence on speci￿c impacts of EPL. Although measuring shirking in the ￿eld is
17See Holland (1986) for an excellent review of the issues.INSTITUTIONS AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 33
di￿cult, Ichino and Riphan (2005) ￿nd evidence of a probation e￿ect similar to ours: worker
absenteeism sharply increases when workers are re-hired beyond the probation period for
employment protection legislation in Italy. Other studies ￿nd a positive correlation between
the strength of employment protection legislation and ￿rms’ usage of temp agency workers
as opposed to long-term contracts (see, e.g., Autor (2003), and Cahuc and Postel-Vinay
(2002)), which is in line with the strategic behavior we observe among ￿rms.References 34
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Figure 1: Average probability that a rm chooses not to re-hire a


























































Figure 2: Average worker eort levels in long-term relationships.
A long-term relationship is dened as the same rm and worker
engaging in a sequence of at least two consecutive, private oer
































































Figure 3: Average market eciency (total economic surplus) in a
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Figure 4: Boxes indicate interquartile ranges (25th to 75th per-
centile) for the distributions of worker eort choices. Circular mark-
ers indicate median eort levels. The sample is restricted to workers
who are ultimately rehired after the probationary period, so eort
distributions in the probation period and later relationship periods






















Figure 5: The distribution of relationship lengths, where a rela-
tionship is dened as a sequence of consecutive private oer con-
tracts between the same worker and rm. The category one-shot
also includes public oer contracts, which occurred when rms
















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
T−Barrier−Bonus T−Bonus
Figure 6: The bonus paid by rms (after observing worker perfor-
mance) as a function of worker performance.43
Contract Form Distinguishing Features Sessions Subjects
Dismissal barrier Bonus pay
T-Baseline fw; ~ eg No No 6 102
T-Barrier fw; ~ eg Yes No 6 102
T-Barrier-Bonus fw; ~ e;~ bg Yes Yes 6 102
T-Bonus fw; ~ e;~ bg No Yes 6 102
Total: 24 408
Table 1: Overview of treatments.44
Eort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cost 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In the following we present representative instructions, in this case for a worker (seller) 
from the treatment T-Barrier. Instructions for firms (buyers) and for participants in other 
treatments are exactly the same, except for including explanation of the option for firms 
to  pay  bonuses  in  the  case  of  T-Barrier-Bonus  and  T-Bonus,  or  excluding  the  final 
section explaining the dismissal barrier institution in the case of T-Bonus and T-Baseline. 
 
 




You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Please read the following 
instructions carefully. Everything that you need to know to participate in this experiment 
is explained below.  Should you have any difficulties in understanding these instructions 
please notify us. We will answer your questions at your cubicle. 
 
 
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive an initial sum of 8 Euro. During the 
course of the experiment you can earn a further amount of money by gaining points. The 
amount of points that you gain during the experiment depends on your decisions and the 
decisions of other participants.  
 
All points that you gain during the course of the experiment will be exchanged into Euro 
at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate will be: 
 
1 point = 4 Cents 
 
At the end of the experiment you will receive the sum of money that you earned 
during the experiment in addition to your 8 Euro initial sum. 
 
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period you have to make decisions which 
you will enter in a computer. There are 18 periods in all. 
 
Please note that communication between participants is strictly prohibited during the 
experiment. In addition we would like to point out that you may only use the computer 
functions which are required for the experiment. Communication between participants 
and unnecessary interference with computers will lead to exclusion from the experiment. 
In case you have any questions we shall be glad to assist you. 
 
Prior to the experiment the 17 participants were divided into 2 groups: buyers and sellers. 
In this experiment there are 10 sellers and 7 buyers. 
 You shall be a seller for the entire course of the experiment. All participants have 
received an identification number, which they will keep for the entire experiment. Your 




An Overview of the Experiment Procedures 
 
In each period of the experiment every buyer can trade a product with one seller. The 
seller earns a profit through the trade when he sells the product at a price that exceeds his 
production costs. The buyer earns a profit through the trade when the price he pays for 
the product is less than what it is worth to him. How high the production costs are for the 
traded product, and how much it is worth to the buyer, depends on the quality of the 
product. 
 
The experiment lasts 18 periods. In each period the procedures are as follows: 
 
1.  Each period commences with a trading phase, which lasts 150 seconds. During this 
phase buyers can submit trade offers, which can be accepted by sellers.  
When submitting an offer a buyer has to specify three things: 
•  which price he offers to pay, 
•  which product quality he desires, 
•  and finally, which seller he wants to submit the offer to. Hereby, buyers can 
submit two types of offers; private offers and public offers. Private offers are 
submitted to one seller only and can only be accepted by that seller. Public 
offers are submitted to all sellers and can be accepted by any seller. 
 
Buyers can submit as many offers as they like in each period. Submitted offers can be 
accepted constantly.  Each buyer and each seller can only enter one trade 
agreement in each period. As there are 10 sellers and 7 buyers, several sellers will 
not trade in each period. 
 
 
2.  Following the trading phase each seller who has entered a trade agreement determines 
which quality of product he will supply to his buyer. Hereby, the seller is not obliged 
to supply the product quality desired by his buyer. 
 
 
Please note: If the same buyer has made private offer to the same seller in two 
consecutive periods, and if the seller has accepted these two offers, the seller enjoys the 
“right to get an offer”. This means that the buyer has to make this seller an offer in the 
next period. If the seller accepts, this “right to get an offer” continues to exist. If he 
rejects, the buyer is free to make an offer to any seller. 
 
Once every seller has chosen which product quality to supply, incomes gained by each 
participant in that period are determined and reported on the screen. After this the next period commences. The points gained from all 18 periods will be summed up at the end 
of the experiment, exchanged into Euros and paid together with your initial sum of 
money in cash. 
 
 
Procedures in Detail 
 
There are 7 buyers and 10 sellers in the experiment. You are a seller for the entire course 
of the experiment. During the experiment you will enter your decisions on the computer. 
In the following we describe in detail how you can make your decisions in each period. 
 
 
1. The Trading Phase 
 
Each period commences with a trading phase. During the trading phase each buyer can 
enter into a trading agreement with one seller. In order to do this the buyers can submit 
trade offers to the sellers. As a seller you can accept one of the offers submitted to you in 
each period. During the trading phase you will see the following screen: 
 
Seller trading screen 
 
•  In the top left corner of the screen you will see the current period of the experiment. 
In the top right corner of the screen you will see the time remaining in this trading 
phase, displayed in seconds. The trading phase in each period lasts 150 seconds. 
When this time is up the trading phase is over. Hereafter, no further offers can be 
submitted or accepted for this period. 
 
•  Once you see the above screen displayed the trading phase commences. As a seller 
you can now accept offers, which buyers have submitted to you. There are two types 
of offers which you can accept: 
 
•  Private offers to you 
Each buyer has the opportunity to submit private offers to you. You alone will be 
informed of these offers and you alone can accept them. No other seller or buyer 
is informed of these offers. If you receive private offers, they will appear on the left 
side of your screen, below the title “private offers to you”. The offer of a buyer will 
contain  the  following  information:  the  identification  number  of  the  buyer  who 
submitted the offer, the price which he offers for the product, and which product 
quality  he  desires.  If  you  want  to  accept  a  private  offer,  you  click  first  on  the 
respective row in which the offer is displayed. When you do this, the offer will be 
highlighted. If you are sure you want to accept the offer you then click on the button 
“accept” which is situated in the bottom left corner of the screen. As long as you do 
not click “accept” you can alter your choice.  
 
 •  Public offers 
Each buyer also has the possibility to submit public offers. All sellers are informed of 
these offers and any seller can accept them. If a buyer submits a public offer it will 
appear on the right side of your screen, below the title “public offers”. The offer of a 
buyer again contains the identification number of the buyer who submitted the offer, 
the price which he offers for the product and which product quality he desires. This 
information is also displayed to all other sellers and all buyers. If you want to accept 
a public offer you follow the same procedures as with private offers. You first click 
on the respective row in which the offer is displayed. When you are sure that you 
want to accept the offer you then click on the button “accept” which is situated in the 
bottom right corner of the screen. As long as you do not click “accept” you can alter 
your choice.  
 
 
•  As soon as you have pressed the “accept” button you will see which offer you have 
accepted in the bottom row of your screen. 
 
•  Each seller can enter only one trade agreement in each period. Once you have 
accepted one offer you cannot accept any further offers. 
 
 
All buyers have to observe the following rules when submitting trade offers: 
 
•  The price offered by the buyer may not be lower than 0 or higher than 100: 
 
0 ≤ price ≤ 100 
 
 
•  The desired quality of the buyer may not be below 1 or higher than 10: 
 
1 ≤ desired quality  ≤ 10 
 
 
•  As long as no offer has been accepted by a seller, the buyer can make as many 
public and private offers as he wishes. Each offer submitted by a buyer can be 
accepted at any time during the trading phase. 
 
•  Each buyer can enter only one trade agreement in each period. Once an offer of a 
buyer has been accepted he will be notified which seller accepted it. As each buyer 
can enter only one trade agreement in each period all other offers of the buyer will be 
automatically cancelled. Also, he will not be able to submit any further offers. 
 
•  Once all 7 buyers have entered a trade agreement or after 150 seconds have elapsed, 
the trading phase is over. 





2. Determination of the Product Quality 
 
•  Following the trading phase, all sellers who have entered a trade-agreement then 
determine which product quality they will supply to their respective buyers. The 
product quality desired by your buyer is not binding for you as a seller. You can 
choose the exact quality desired by your buyer, but also a higher or lower product 
quality. If you have entered a trade agreement during a trading phase, the following 
screen will appear for you to enter the product quality: 
 
Seller quality choice screen 
 
In order to choose the actual product quality, you enter the value for the quality in the 
field “Determine the actual product quality” and press the “ok” button to confirm your 
choice. As long as you have not pressed “ok” you can alter your choice. 
 
•  The product quality that you choose must be an integer between 1 and 10. 
 









•  If you have not entered a trade agreement during a trading phase you gain an 
income of 5 points for that period. 
 
•  If you have accepted a trade offer your income depends on the price you accepted and 
the product quality you chose to deliver. Your income will be calculated as follows:   
 
Your income  = Price -  production costs 
 
•  Your production costs are higher, the higher the quality of the product you chose to 
deliver. The production costs for each product quality are displayed in the table 
below: 
 
 Quality  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Production- 
cost 
0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  18 
 
•  Your income is therefore higher, the lower your chosen product quality. Furthermore, 




The income of your buyer: 
 
•  If a buyer does not enter a trade agreement during a trading phase he gains an income 
of 0 points for that period. 
 
•  If one of his trade offers is accepted, his income depends on which price he offered 
and which product quality was supplied to him. The income of your buyer will be 
determined as follows: 
 
Income of your buyer = 10 * product quality  - price 
 
•  As you can see from the above formula the income of your buyer is higher, the higher 
is the product quality actually supplied by you. At the same time his income is higher, 
the lower the price he paid for the product. 
 
 
The income of all buyers and sellers are determined in the same way. Each buyer can 
therefore calculate the income of his seller and each seller can calculate the income 
of his buyer. Furthermore, each buyer and seller is informed of the identification number 
of his trading partner in each period. 
 
Please note that buyers and sellers can incur losses in each period. These losses have to 
be paid from your initial sum of money or from earnings in other periods. 
 
You will be informed of your income and the income of your buyer on an “income 
screen”. On the screen (see below) the following will be displayed: 
•  Which buyer you traded with 
•  Which price he offered 
•  The desired quality of your buyer 
•  The product quality supplied by you 
•  The income of your buyer in this period 
•  Your income in this period. 
 
Seller income screen 
 Please enter all the information in the documentation sheet supplied to you. After the 
income screen has been displayed, the respective period is concluded. Thereafter the 
trading phase of the following period commences. Once you have finished studying the 
income screen please click on the “next” button. 
 
The buyers also view an income screen, which displays the above information. They see 





“Right to get an offer”-Rule 
 
There is one more rule to consider. If the same buyer has made two private offers to the 
same seller in two consecutive periods, and both offers were accepted so that they each 
lead to a trade agreement, the seller enjoys the “right to get an offer” in the next period. 
This is the case, e.g., if buyer 1 makes seller 2 private offers, one in period 3 and one in 
period 4, which are both accepted by seller 2. Starting from period 5, seller 2 then enjoys 
the “right to get an offer”.  
 
The right to get an offer is thus established when a buyer has traded at least twice with 
the same seller, and if these trades came about through private offers. If trade comes 
about based on a public offer, the right to get an offer is not established. Thus the buyer 
himself can decide whether he wants to enter a relationship with or without the right to 
get an offer. 
 
In other words the “right to get an offer” means that in the next period the buyer 
must make the seller an offer that is available as soon as soon as the trading phase 
begins. This offer consists of a price and desired quality. The price must be at least as 
high as in the previous period. 
 
If the same buyer has offered you two times in a row a private offer, which you accepted, 
you enjoy the right to get an offer. This means “your” buyer must make you an offer in 
the next period. In this case the trading phase begins with the following screen. 
 
Modified trading phase screen 
 
This is the same screen as on page 3 with the only difference that on the upper right 
corner you now see the offer of your buyer. In addition you also see the other public and 
private offers, which have been offered to you and the other sellers. You can accept the 
offer of “your” buyer or any other offer that has been made (private or public) by 
other buyers.  
 
As long as you have not yet decided, “your” buyer cannot make another offer to you 
or another seller. This means that you can accept the offer of “your” buyer as long as 
you have not declined it (and trading time has not yet elapsed).   
Your buyer will be informed about your decision. If you reject his offer or if you accept 
another buyer’s offer, “your” buyer is free to make offers to other sellers. As long as you 
have not yet decided, all “your” buyer can do is wait and observe the market. 
 
If you accept the offer of “your” buyer, he will also make you an offer in the next period. 
Only if you reject his offer or if you accept the offer of another buyer, the right to get an 
offer expires. This means that the right to get an offer can only be terminated by 
yourself. 
 
An example concerning the right to get an offer: Suppose buyer 1 and seller 2 have traded 
in periods three and four, based on two private offers.  Starting from period 5 seller 2 
then enjoys the right to get an offer. This means that buyer 1 has to make seller 2 an offer 
in the fifth period before the trading period begins. If seller 2 accepts, the relation 
remains and buyer 1 will make seller 2 an offer also in period 6. If seller 2 rejects, the 




The experiment will not commence until all participants are completely familiar with all 
procedures. In order to secure that this is the case we kindly ask you to solve the 
exercises below. 
 
In addition we will conduct a training trial of the trading phase, so that you can get 
accustomed to the computer. This trial phase will not be added to the result of the 
experiment and therefore not remunerated. Following the trial phase we will begin the 







Please solve the following problems including the solution approach. If you have any 
questions  please  ask  the  experimenter.  Wrong  answers  have  no  consequences 
whatsoever.   
 
Problem 1: 
You have not accepted any offer during a trading period. What is your income in this 
particular period? 
 
Your income =  
Problem 2: 
You have accepted an offer, containing a price of 60 and a desired quality of 9. You 
choose an actual quality of 9. 
          Your income =  
 
         Income of your buyer =  
 
Problem 3: 
You have accepted an offer, containing a price of 60 and a desired quality of 9. You 
choose an actual quality of 4. 
 
         Your income =  
 
         Income of your buyer =  
 
Problem 4: 
You have accepted an offer, containing a price of 40 and a desired quality of 2. You 
choose an actual quality of 5. 
 
         Your income =  
 
         Income of your buyer =  
 
Problem 5: 
You have accepted an offer, containing a price of 10 and a desired quality of 6. You 
choose an actual quality of 6. 
 
         Your income =  
 
         Income of your buyer =  
Problem 6: 
Suppose you have accepted a private offer from a particular buyer in period 5. In period 6 
you accept a public offer coming from the same buyer. Do you enjoy the right to get an 
offer starting from period 7? 
o  Yes 
o  No 
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